and 35 minute event.

>> good morning and welcome to the national press club. we like to start a program now since c-span3 is broadcasting this live set for 8:30. we realize some people are out waiting two to to the storm last night and perhaps we will have a few people walking in while the program is going on but we would like to get going. my name is less glick. i would like to welcome me this morning to a program called do we need fast-track trade promotion authority lacks some of you may have seen our program last week on the same topic on c-span3. i watched it. they had a panel of the four former u.s. trade representatives including sue schwab and several others. all of those prior u.s. trade representatives seem to have similar views on fast-track. today you are going to hear some differing views of some

distinguished representatives of the public interest community and the labor movement. our moderator today will introduce the speakers and i had the pleasure this morning to introduce our moderator charlie sub two. charlie had a distinguished career both in government and private industry. from 1971 to 1980 he served in a series of diplomatic positions in the state department and then he joined the office of u.s. trade representative says the directors deal policy from 1980 to 1982. steel was a particularly hot issue in the states and some of you probably remember the voluntary restraint agreements. charlie then moved on to the post-deputy assistant ustr for industry 1982 to 1983 and then was promoted to the post assistant u.s. trade representative for industry where he served from 83 to 85 and then finally understood as distinguished career at ustr

stasis and trade representative full marks the -- for multilateral trade negotiations from 1985 to 1988 the period a figure grave -- uruguay trade negotiations. charlie has a masters degree from the university of pennsylvania and has taught as an adjunct or thus are the business at the american university school of business. it's a pleasure to meet -- for me to turn over our program to charlie blum. [applause] >> thank you for that kind introduction. that certainly more respect than we usually get them i'm personally very grateful for that. i'm grateful to the economy in crisis and the our association for sponsoring this program and to all of you who've braved the ice storm to get here so early on a monday morning. your presence here is testimony to the timeliness and importance of the larger debate that is

shaping up all across this town and did my experience at least all across our country. there is a lot of confusion among americans about what trade or motion authority really is, whether it is necessary or desirable and the specific role that fast-track authority plays in the approval of trade of agreements. to set the stage for this morning's discussion i want to very briefly present the case being made by those who assert the fast-track authority is an essential feature for american trade and economic policy. to take one prominent example let me cite the five points better dance by the u.s. chamber of commerce to answer the questions that they posed, why does america need trade promotion authority? the first are familiar to anyone who follows trade debates. they argue the number one trade supports jobs and growth. number two trade is vital to

small is this an number three trade agreements level the playing field. and then they get to the part that really is the core of the current controversy. i will read these in their full. it's only a few bullet points each. reason number four, we can do more to seize the benefits of trade and these are their points. to extend these benefits the u.s. has embarked on it old trade agenda that includes negotiations for the transpacific hardener ship with other asia-pacific countries. transatlantic trade and investment partnership ttip with the european union and the trade in services agreement with some 50 other countries. reason five to do any of the above they argue america needs tpa. and there are four points here. to finalize these agreements congress must approve trade promotion authority.

the constitution gives the congress the authority to regulate international trade but it gives the president gordy to negotiate with foreign governments. tpa builds on this constitutional partnership by requiring the executive branch to consult extensively with congress during negotiations while assuring u.s. trading partners that it emits will receive an up-or-down vote at the end of the day. their last argument every resident since franklin d. roosevelt has had tpa. every president should have it. that is the baseline case, answering clearly in the affirmative. it's my pleasure today to turn the microphone over to to distinguish speakers who have another take on the effectiveeffectiveness and limitations to trade agreements and the appropriate roles for the congress and executive branch and setting trade negotiations in evaluating the results from most agreements.

lori wallach is a familiar figure among trade experts in washington a graduate of wellesley and harvard law. she served as director of public citizen's global trade watch. whether or not they agree with her those who care about trade and globalization recognize that the different knowledge and her hula teacher translates the legal points into plain english. that is a challenge, lori. lori has done us all a service by researching and writing a book called the rise and fall of fast-track authority. it is being studied and analyzed in many congressional and lobbying offices these days. tom buffenbarger is the president of the international association of machinists and aerospace workers founded 145 years ago. tom is a member of the flc iao in dust or union council serves as vice president of the board

of the international metalworkers foundation. in the past he was a member of the treasury department's advisory committee to the international advisory monetary fund and currently chairs the labor advisories committee. one of the many private-sector advisory groups that are intended to provide the u.s. trade representatives and other agencies with advice on a broad range of trade negotiation and trade policy issues. we are truly fortunate to have two such distinguished panelists and we look forward to their recitation followed by what i'm sure will be a lively discussion with no further ado, tom the floor is yours. >> thank you very much for the kind introduction and i do want to clarify one point. having served in the capacity of a member of the treasury

department's advisory on the international monetary fund, that was the imf and i'm honored to serve though it's been renamed the vice president of the good imf the international international -- foundation. ladies and jumped him and it's an honor to be here this morning. the iam represents several hundred thousand active and retired members in north america. our members work in a variety of ministries including aerospace, transportation shipbuilding woodworking defense and elect tronics to name a few. iam members design, old and assemble and maintain the goods and services that keep the u.s. economy growing. and they keep the u.s. safe and secure. our members produce goods and services that are exported all over the world.

while we believe in global trade and we have seen first-hand its benefits, our members have also felt this harsh impact. we dream of a global economy that works for u.s. workers as well as workers throughout the world. sadly we have a long way to go in order to make this a reality. for u.s. aerospace workers whose jobs have moved to mexico or china, for over 1000 bangladeshi apparel workers that ran a plaza while earning roughly 18 cents an hour, for enslaved children working on cocoa plantations in the ivory coast or for the millions of people who work every day for wages that are far below poverty level. the global economy has failed them. our nation's trade policies

contributing to this failure. it has led to trade agreements with countries like mexico which continued to persecute mexican trade unionists such as

if tpp is implemented, u.s. manufacturing may find itself on the endangered species list. soon, the full-court press will be on to past tpp. proponents of tpp will want to sidestep criticisms and concerns about the deal through the old framework of fast-track by limiting congressional authority to repeal or review the deal. they will claim how the agreement will benefit our nation and support the creation of thousands of jobs. they will also argue that if we don't join the pac, we will get left behind. they will undoubtedly resurrect

their ridiculous claim that anyone who criticizes fast-track authority and the tpp is anti-trade. they could not be more wrong. we are painfully aware how fast-track authority in the past has been a precursor to trade agreements with mexico, colombia and south korea. they have wreaked havoc on u.s.-mexican and colombian workers. fast-track authority is very much a part of our nation's failed policy. a trade policy that is long overdue for a major overhaul. the iam firmly believes a 21st century trade policy that focuses on workers and their communities, not the bottom line profit sheet of u.s. corporations who have no loyalty to the workers that made them so profitable.

the 21st century trade policy that we believe in does not merely pay lip service to jobs when it is complete -- politically convenient that will lead to the creation and maintenance of good jobs across industries, sectors and geographical locations. the 21st century trade policy that we abdicate will not tolerate backroom deals which depend on keeping critical information from the public. it will also not grant foreign investors greater rights than domestic companies and it will in no way interfere with national and local governments ability to protect their health, worker safety and social standards. it will make certain that no signatory country will manipulate its currency. and last but not least, our 21st century trade policy will

once and for all mandatorily require that countries who want to be a part of trade agreements with the u.s. recognized and effectively enforce fundamental human rights which include labor standards defined by the conventions. before they are eligible to sign the trade agreement with the united states. as i just mentioned it cannot be business as usual when negotiating trade deals. we continue to urge congress to consider undertaking the following activities. first, learn from our past mistakes. let's face it, grandiose predictions that trade agreements will support hundreds of thousands of u.s. jobs have been plain wrong. we need to learn where we have been before deciding where we need to go. isn't it time that we at least

studied the actual impact of trade agreements are having on all u.s. workers before we consider yet another trade deal? we can start a fixing the mess that our government uses to predict the numbers of jobs that will be impacted a trade agreements. that method has been wildly inaccurate. just ask any manufacturing worker whose job has moved to mexico or whose wages have been kept low under the threat that his or her job will move to mexico. they would be the first that would question the accuracy of the prediction that nafta would sub wart 200,000 jobs because chances are high that their job was one of the nearly 700,000 u.s. jobs that were lost to mexico by 2010. 20 years ago today nafta was

signed. wrong estimates don't just involve nafta. according to the government the u.s. south korea trade agreement would support 70,000 u.s. jobs. in reality, according to the economic policy institute, in the year after the agreement took effect the increasing trade deficit with south korea has cost the u.s. at least 40,000 jobs most in manufacturing. any impact study must be straightforward, reliable and provide specific information on each trade agreements impacts on u.s. jobs by industry, geography, wages and benefits. this precise information cannot be gleaned by merely estimating job numbers from export.relations the way it has currently done. congress and the american people have every right to know how trade agreements have been and

will be of acting their jobs. secondly, congress must assert its role in choosing our trade heart nurse. congress should define specific conditions that must be met for any potential trade agreement partner. these conditions should include a number of fat ears including an examination of whether a country currently and enforces fundamental human rights like the right to form a union and engage in collective are gettino conventions jurisprudence. they should also include basic information on whether country manipulates its currency. violates environmental standards uses subsidies or demands transfers of production entrance of -- technology to implement its own industrial policies. third, negotiation objectives laid out by congress must be

mandatory and certified. current fast-track authority simply lists negotiation objectives without any requirement that each object it be met. if negotiation objectives are not mad like a long lists a labor chapter that is based on ilo conventions of jurisprudence, then the deal should not be eligible for fast-track authority. signatory countries must also certify that they have met all of the requirements provided under the trade agreement prior to passage. there are simply no excuse is that colombia was able to sign onto an agreement agreement will human rights violations continued. each member of congress and relevant committees should have a significant role in determining negotiation object gets.

fourthly, negotiations must be built on transparency. due to the expedited nature of fast-track it is important that private groups have been up her tendency to provide their advice on for those trade agreements. while most members of the public are not privy to the specific areas of trade negotiations, the ustr relies on the trade advisories committee system to obtain advice for individuals in the private sector. the trade act of 1974 sought to achieve a mechanism or creating a strong and unified national trade policy by providing a tendency is for diverse trade impacted groups to engage in meaningful and effective consultations with government officials. unfortunately the trade advisory committee system is failing miserably to achieve this goal. groups like labor have either been underrepresented or not

represented at all in the visor a committee system. the most seriously deficient level of trade visor a system is the third. level concerning technical and detailed sectoral industrial matters. indeed despite statutory language indicating otherwise, not one labor representative is a member of the 16 industrial type you could buy three committees known as a tax. for that matter not one labor representative has been selected to serve on the manufacturing committee and now represented from a manufacturing union participates on the president's export council. the federal trade visor a committee system is instrumental in providing a mechanism for the private sector community to it by his our trade negotiators on general and specific areas of trade.

it is particularly critical in view of how fast-track authority has been delegated to the administration. the exclusion of labor should no longer be tolerated. if it does continue, it will be to the detriment of the development and implementation of our national trade policy. this is something we cannot afford. our old trade policy is broken beyond repair. u.s. workers and their communities deserve so much more than the empty promises of past and proposed trade deals. they have immediate acts that will result in good and decent jobs here at home. the stakes have never been hired to get it right. resurrecting the old framework of fast-track authority is not needed, not wanted and will make it easier to continue the failed

trade policies of the last century. with rep ports that tpp is nearing completion and that our steadfast up decision to it this may very well be our last opportunity to save u.s. manufacturing and ensure a sustainable and prosperous future for the next generation. thank you very much. [applause] >> i also want to thank the sponsors for inviting me to participate and say good morning to everybody and i am going to focus a little bit on the process and the history of the actual fast-track and trade negotiating authority to complement what presidents

buffenbarger sought oligopoly outlined about the failure of the outcomes of that reticular procedure for creating u.s. trade agreements. a lot of the members of congress who are now in office, in fact almost all of them weren't here before 1974 which is when fast-track was first established. so like my grandmother used to say, huber for a vacuum cleaner, fast-track his become synonymous for trade authority and in fact it's not the only form. in fact it's an anomaly compared to two and years of u.s. history. the history of u.s. trade authority goes back to the boston tea party. the u.s. was founded in a trade war so when the columnist decided they were going to have anymore of those taxes, those taxes were actually terrorists. it was the king of england signing proposed tariffs on trade and tea among other things

to generate money for his foreign wars trade grade when the founders wrote the constitution they very explicitly made sure that congress, the body closest to the people had exclusive authority over trade. they wanted to make sure the executive couldn't just unilaterally impose some trade policy that favored a friend or foreign interests. so when the founders wrote the constitution in article i a congress had exclusive authority over foreign commerce and setting tariffs. nixon in 1974 came in and with fast track up-ended 200 years of congress is control of trade policy that the founders wisely created in the constitution. but also fast-track open the door to what is often called diplomatic legislative as well as giving the executive branch a new and enormous role in control over trade agreements. fast-tracked or the first time ever authorized u.s. negotiators

to actually set rules in trade negotiations on issues that had nothing to do with trade. it was authority to negotiate binding rules and everything from food aid to how your government state and federal can spend your tax dollars on goods and services. ..

now in researching this book, the rise and fall of fast-track trade authority, which we were able to do text to a generous grant from the sloan foundation, we went into the bowels of the library of congress, the pre electronic record and dug up all of the original documents on trade authority since the founding of the country. what we found were, first of all

, five totally separate mechanisms domiciles a trade authority over the years and a constant set of scenes. congress would experiment in giving a little bit of authority to the executive branch, and then the executive branch would rabbit, run away, and congress woul . . one has a gatherer of data until now . there were two huge sets of fast-track that jump through many decades of history right to 1974. number one, it let negotiators making trade policy suddenly negotiate what are called non tariff issues, but we think of those as our domestic environmental, food safety, financial, zoning land use laws. trade negotiations.

and while the private sector advisory system gets put in place. this is the 600 private-sector advisers, almost all of whom represent corporate interests. there are lovely 19 labor representatives trickled in there to environ less, one consumer group and no partridge or pear tree. seriously. this is a totally unbalanced system with 600 corporate visor's telling our negotiators what they ought to be doing. now how is it that trade agreements can affect our domestic policy? the binding rule in all of our current trade agreements as the following, signatory countries shall insure the conformity of all domestic laws, regulations, and administrative procedures. that is to say that all existing and future u.s. laws must be conformed to the terms in the trade agreement. consider the agreement now that president obama is seeking fast track for the trans-pacific

partnership. twenty-nine chapters, the text just of the non-tariff stuff is the size of very large phone book, and only five chapters are about trade. twenty-four chapters of rewriting u.s. law to the back door of secretive closed-door 600 corporate adviser influence trade negotiations. this form of diplomatic legislating has been used by democratic and republican person to tap presidents since nafta and wto. if, for instance, how we got ourselves an extension of medicine back that increase medicine prices enormously when we had to it shift from a 17 year monopoly companies a 20. did congress say yes? no, repeatedly they said no. they side with consumers. that was written into the world trade organization and we had to conform loss. did congress agree to lock in

65,000 age one be visas no matter how high the u.s. unemployment is? on their own. that was the wto. we have to reform immigration law. how about meat and poultry safety? do you think all the meat that comes into the country meet standards? that was true before nafta and wto. we had to rewrite laws to reform to a rule that allows us to import things that are equivalent, determined by the other country. exit tracks at traffic center. now, what is of with fast-track politically? directly related to the attack on congress jurisdictional authority since nafta and fast track has become exceedingly unpopular. so after nafta passed president clinton was unable said ever get fast-track trade authority again .

an important fact of congressional history is that actually congress on a bipartisan majority in the house of representatives voted down clinton's attempts to get fast track in 98. he chided 97. did not happen. he tried in 98, 171 democrats and 71 republicans said i'm sticking with the founders. and not giving away my constitutional authority demand that was the end of president clinton having fast track. he had it for two of his eight years. a fine thing, the man implemented 130 trade agreements, including some really big ones through normal procedures. trade agreements are about trade . trade agreements there about backdoor attack on u.s. law, special incentives to offshore jobs. those require legislative luge run that is fast track which is to say a grimace that don't work for us require some way around congress, and that is it one

more reason why it is inappropriate and should be done spend. the last allegation was obtained by george w. bush after clinton did not get it, it took bush two years and an enormous amount of political capital to pass by one vote in the house of representatives in 2002 in the middle of the night and watching people not in pain after they stop the congressional clock. we are talking manipulation, harassment, hell, two years of work, and one vote passage a fast track. that delegation, and it ended in 2007. president obama is now going to try, he says, to get fast track again. what exactly is fast track and how does it work? this is the story. once it is in effect congress delegates over to the president

the following five separate parties that previously were in the authority of congress. one, to unilaterally take our trade partners. for instance, that is how we get columbia kaj country whenever should have been negotiating a trade agreement with, as they are the number one side of unionist assassinations in the world. one country, more than all the other countries together. our trade partner. only because fast track allowed george w. bush unilaterally picks as country. pick the country, set the terms. fast-track is negotiating objectives. we heard there not enforceable. fast track the created nafta and wto, negotiating objective requiring mandatory labor standards. are there labor standards in math and wto? no. because the initiator can do whatever they want and still the agreement goes down the legislative luge run.

there were allowed to sign the agreement before congress voted with the guarantee that when congress finally got its post rubberstamp moment the terms were the executive branch rice the legislation. this is the only bill the executive branch rights. this is not the annual budget show where the president's budget is will barrel then likened to recycling. they're rate this bill and it goes into the hopper. it does not get community markup. does not committee amendments because right to the floor, and in congress but on the voting handcuffs. and a vote comes up the most of yes or no, no amendments from the maximum 20 hours of debate. and the final deal, the other key constitutional authority article 15, congress writes its own rules, congress loses control of when the vote happens. there's a guaranteed yes or no vote 90 days after the white house press the bill after

signing the agreement, after picking the country all by themselves, congress must vote like are not. it is privileged on the floor. that system is now we got into nafta and wto. but a key fact about fast-track to quickly debunks the myths is number one is not how we even normally do trade agreements since 1974. as on the been used 16 times in the history of our country. major events like china p.m. tiara or free trade agreements like jordan were passed without it. number two, it has not been the key to expanding trade. in fact, since we started using fast track the u.s. trade deficit as bloated. since nafta and wto we've lost over 5 million of our manufacturing jobs from a 40,000 factories gone, and real wages down across the economy. in fact, true honesty, our exports rose to countries we do

not have fast-track trade agreements with, actually 38 percent higher than those with which we do. myth number three, every president since roosevelt has said tpa. morning, trick, acronym. tpa also is an acronym for trade promotion authority, a cynical renaming a fast track, but it is also the reciprocal tariff act is called trade promotion the tory. and that is a mechanism president roosevelt had that only pertained to tariffs. the estimate is true, from 1934 the reciprocal tariff act had tariff, proclamation a story, tpa. a totally different thing than what equals fast track. true. a handful of president since nixon have had fast track. for the politics, the question is will this house of representatives give president

obama this extraordinary authority to push through the trans pacific partnership, an agreement congress has had no access to, observer status for, negotiated with the executive branch acting as if fast-track were in place and the legislative handcuffs or on. and all and -- all indications are not so fast. bipartisan opposition is growing , and if folks want to hear the history in more detail, read the history in more detail, please get a copy of my book. thank you very much. [applause] >> i think it will work best. i will try to stand and take your questions, but i think probably the panelists should stay seated so we don't have commotion. as with accuracy the whole room. if you have a question or brief

comments and would like for you to raise your hand. will recognize you. it will bring you the microphone . if you would identify yourself before speaking, that would be a terrific assistance to everybody. who would like to go first place? >> mark berlin. i guess real and for tom, the advisory committees supposedly have and 77 plus over trade policy. aren't they just window dressing in so many words? these icky branch does what every damn well pleases without regard to either congress or industry or labor or anybody else. >> you go first. >> i would agree with the premise of that question, it is when addressing. previous administrations it was rare to have meetings of the advisor committee to the u.s.

tiara office. it improved somewhat in a short tenure of suzanne schwab and then with president obama taking office, would relieve the encouragement and guidance of the secretary of labor, she was very consistent that the trade representative have these meaning some more frequent basis so we did meet maybe tarsier. at the meetings it was usually to plead with the administration to cease and desist on some of the directions that they were taking on trade policy. in fact, we came away pretty much as though the meeting never occurred. >> let me add, since i left the government in 88i have had no

direct involvement with the advisory committees. in fact, the terms -- their involvement limits their ability. they're supposed to represent sectors, but they're really handcuffed in terms of discussing issues because they're sworn to secrecy on so many points. i would just argue from my own experience it was a simpler time, but we use the advisory committee isn't radically differently. i met with them all the time. there was no consensus. my policy was to meet with everybody every time there in washington. when they wanted better not. and then if they invited me to their annual meetings i would go out. he paid special attention to agriculture. it was great skepticism. the antidote for that was enormous out reach. i don't see that happening right now. i think it is a detriment not

only of the politics of this issue, but also the substance of it. not just this one the previous ones have made a big mistake. >> is not necessary to listen to. the actual negotiating seems to be some of that going on regardless of what the official policy is. that ability actually see what is on the table, to shape the documents that the u.s. is going to submit and all of our demands in negotiations is actually extremely impact full even if in the end they are not listened to because having that information lets you know what is at hand at stake, to lobby for. is informations.

>> joanne and the person on your left. >> thank you. thank you very much, charlie, lori, and thomas. it's a great discussion. i am joined thorn, an independent public policy consultant on trade issues. i'm going to talk to lori first, i lamberto little bit on the comment that the clinton administration was able to implement -- i don't know if i wrote this down correctly. did you say 130 trade agreements without fast-track authority? and i am interested in how those are defined. and then to both of you, there is lot of press lately at the wto having finally reached an agreement. a package of fairly modest agreements, although i have not

seen any text chat. wondering what you think of that is that the tide of trade agreement that we will see implemented here without fast-track authority since no one seems to be talking about fast-track authority? >> no 1203. -- trade agreements, the united states trade representative who served as an major chunk of the clinton administration. she said that in a speech here at the national press club in describing why it was not an impediment to her getting trade expansion and a way to not have fast track. there is a congressional record reference to 138 cheered agreements by congressman the seraphs from the ways and means committee. if you look at the floor debate in 2001 and the original bush fast-track house vote you can check out that. he lists a bunch of countries.

as far as the wto agreement, again, and in a way that is not going to help congress is more enthusiastic about sharing its constitutional trade authority with the executive branch, the administration's original position is they are not bringing it to congress. they have negotiated. they are not bringing in for a vote which is remarkably imperious command we shall see what happens. i'm sure it will help the enthusiasm to give away their official authority. that being said, there has been such a bunch of hoopla about the very exciting announcement that could come any day that senator baucus and congressman kemp might agree on fast track except senator baucus and congressman kemp have always agreed. in fact, the two of them both voted for the 2002 fast track when, for instance, there was quite enormous opposition. so to me what is news about the

fast track situation in the u.s. is why these two guys are the chairman of the committees of jurisdiction have not introduced any trade authority legislation despite their saying since easter of last year that they had a deal almost ready and it was going to go in at any moment it is all of these months of down my this begs the question, given what the house looks like right now, assuming the bill goes into more, this four days left, nothing was it done. so next year when they're going to have crazy season kicks in my summer of the midterm elections, and six months is the republican house clung to give the democratic president they just really love and respect fast-track trade authority which took president bush two years to make credible blood, sweat and tears and lots of political deals to accomplish by one of? to me what is really fairly newsworthy is the prospect that

it will be given not just not the wto deal which they want to bring the congress to vote. >> i will respond to the concern about the announced agreements or at least the pretense of it with the wto having been instrumental in leading in the largest delegation of 10,000 machinists and seattle when the wto map there. i am skeptical of anything that includes in his description wto. and having not seen anything yet in a society where our government knows everything about us, we can't find but very little about it, i really cannot comment with any accuracy on it, but i am a skeptic, have become more so the older i get with the

issues of international trade agreements. >> thank you very much. so some congressional leaders have in recent months, for instance, send 11 has touted that track as a potential mechanism to deliver greater congressional authority. an outline, considering the five policies pay you just enumerated that essentially abdicate congressional authority to the executive branch cannot be think lawmakers are reconciling that? and if i might, although there has been opposition through letters to your referenced, they're very well may be sufficient support. what you think is the reason for the support?

carper subservience? was going on? >> well, first of all, on the situation with congressman levin , he has given lots of speeches describing his position and concerns about trade authority. and obviously will let him speak for himself. again, in a news for the department is that, in fact, after a year of negotiations that were called the big four negotiations between the ranking members in the chairs of the ways and means and finance committees, it's quite newsworthy that it is on the chin chairman's who are about to allegedly may be finally this time, but fast-track legislation which is to say it is not clear that the ranking member, and longtime supporter, is in on this about to be enough steel, nor apparently his congressman of the. and from his speeches he sounds like he is actually on the right track.

he wants to have a new kind of trade authority. so it sounds like he is the guy who realizes that it is way overdue to try and replace. we need a new mechanism for trade authority. but he is talking about is not the old fast track. he is talking about the new trade promotion authority for the 21st century which can put a steering wheel and emergency brake on congress. now what he may propose as an alternative is going to satisfy those needs and remedy this problem is remains to be seen and he comes up with something, but what in his speeches he has talked about is exactly what president often burger was talking about which is, you would not could be expedited procedure. you would not get any of visibility staff congress at the end game not have amendments and less of fraud congress had a much greater will, including to certify that when it sets objections, there were actually

meant. try and make the objectives mandatory into conditioning any favorable treatment on the back and having congress actually tell initiators what to do and then make sure they do it before they then give them the next up. something along those lines is actually a last chapter of my book which is, how you have to replace fast track was something appropriate by giving congress opportunities along the way to actually say, yes, you did it, no, you couldn't. back to the table so that congress has control over the substance, not the executive branch. >> i'm just going to add to laurie's last point. for many initiators point of view your lot better, more effective if you are backed by this kind of mandate.

i was lucky enough in the 80's to have lots of congressional support for what we were doing with respect to steal and for that matter launching. that made easier. we knew when to say no and when the situation is as modeled as it is now and the directions are so unclear, the process of secretive, the negotiators are at great risk. i think that is part of the price to repay for our intention to appropriate mechanisms. >> think you very much. it's a great program. a question i have his related to exchange-rate issues. my understanding is that we do not normally address exchange rates in the free trade agreements and that when free trade agreements can be done that the of the country, were exempt -- for example, to devalue its currency will make our exports to that country much more difficult to get in because it would be increased in price

and make exports from that country to the united states much cheaper. both of these trends will feed the trade deficit. we have run about 10 trillion with the trade deficit. it is my further understanding and members of congress, the majority in both the house and senate have written to the administration asking him to address exchange rates is that being done? is that being discussed in terms of whether to give the president trade promotion authority if these issues should be dispensed and included in trade agreements? >> who was to take that one? >> we have certainly had, among the ranks of the labor community those very same concerns and those discussions, whether it is being addressed in the rounds of

t pp initiations i cannot answer being not at the table, but we find the same level of concern. and the history speaks volumes about the unwillingness or the refusal to make such conversations on exchange rates or currency manipulations, of very serious part of the talks that go on in these negotiations. >> please. >> i want to reiterate that we have no idea whether they have dealt with the issue because the process is so secretive. but for my snipping around the negotiations -- and i have a team on the ground right now in singapore, it appears the u.s. negotiators have not even raised the issue. keep in mind with that means. 230 house members which means a bunch of republicans and democrats agreed on something.

sixty senators, a veto override majority, got together and said we are congress, we have constitutional authority over trade. the wanting all of us actually agree on is you have to put currency manipulation disciplines and the dpp because it includes a bunch of countries and manipulate the currency. the executive branch is continuing negotiations basically saying, did you hear something from congress? best we can tell them not even raise the issue. those letters were put forward in june and you're supposed to sign the agreement, though they are not going to. front-page. a huge set of leaks. but that is the level of dismissal that has gotten congress upset. now, this gets back to your question about why they would never think about giving away. the fact is, there is enormous pressure by a very powerful corporate lobby. these trade agreements elected corporate christmas tree. what is one of?

in one fell swoop can have the u.s. chronic of shoring manufacturing companies. bad for business monopolists. big farmers, big tobacco, mining all united with their lobby dollars. it is a so-called trade agreement that is not about trade which implements through the backdoor their agenda. wall street to believe so there is enormous power against the people's will and the constitutional empowerment of congress to have fast-track make it possible to ram railroad backward trade agreements. it is not as if it is a done deal even with this huge opposition authority. that won't happen. i suspect that the public is speaking to the members of congress and as members of congress want to keep their jobs

and not be the next trade pink slip casualty, then the prospect of fast track into the house can really be diminished. on the currency issue, the 1. i want to make goes to the agreement that president offender raised. an agreement has been in effect for 18 months. a lot of members of congress said there had to be currency disciplines in an agreement because there was the only countries that the treasury department has ever cited as an official currency manipulator. we knew in advance. executive branch said, no, not going to do it. sorry. what happened? eighteen months, not just have we had a huge flood of more imports from korea, we have seen our exports dropped 9%. we have a 40% bigger trade deficit with korea in 18 months of one more of these agreements, and currency is the biggest part

have the tariff cuts and 90 unimplemented. >> let me add to that. about two years before the last days of the caribbean fta talks according to the peterson institute numbers the most undervalued currency in the world, significantly more undervalued and the chinese. as they were negotiating, this is what countries do, of course, they reduced to that from a 50% under evaluation to five. now they are under heavy pressure from the export industries, very powerful in korea, under pressure to increase the under evaluation, the same dynamic in japan. when the yen hit 79 to the dollar there is a great outcry from the export oriented industries in japan.

in response to that by one means or another the government has moved when the rate to about 101. that is to benefit the export industry and it kills our exports. that dynamic is left unaddressed by any trade agreement and i think she is correct. i check on the hill all the time the treasury and the u.s. tiara have refused to raise this issue , which is supposed to set the basic rules for trade agreements for the rest of the century. so not to do it now is really to commit not to do it for a long time. if there is ever an opportunity to address this issue it has to be the two pp. next question. >> hi. i was wondering if you could expand more on the recently linked documents and what is

more important. anything else you can tell us from what is happening in singapore. >> you are the leaker. >> i am the analyst. the leader remains unknown. this is with reference to two documents that leach yesterday and are now on wikileaks and the front page of nothing to boast with charm and memo from one of the country's involved describing as they are going into this alleged in the game deal negotiation of ministers, trade ministers what the circumstances are and then had charged remarkably that as all of the positions of all of the countries and all of the outstanding issues. and i would say there is some key things worth noting. number one, overarching lee how

far the country's far from agreement thankfully given what the chart shows is at stake. as far as things that would undermine all of our futures. a second overarching theme of was interesting was the country who is the source of the memo writes about how they need to very carefully manage the outcomes of this big ministerial meeting in singapore last the world should sink -- think the entire process is in trouble given that ppp has now amassed its third deadline in three years, likely according to this memo. the general just is there is no way they can make a real deal. should we announce a deal and pretend there is one or should we admit there is not a deal. and then on the substance i think the most telling issues were sadly the united states is pushing a really outrageous big

pharmaceutical company agenda of patent extensions, data exclusivity, attacks on national health care, madison pressboards that would really not only deny people the other countries access to affordable medicine but also undermine some of the improvements we have seen in our country recently on trying to get medicine prices down which is really egregious. the good news is the u.s. is totally isolated except for japan. japan and the u.s. pushing this rare trade agenda. the second thing which was pretty telling is the u.s. and japan are and it is trying to expand the investor state, investor privileges regime which lets foreign companies skirt domestic laws in court and attack domestic laws demanding compensation from taxpayers for any domestic law or policy that they think undermines the expected future profits. this is out eli lilly is suing

the canadian government for half a billion dollars in medicine patens, how the big tobacco given -- companies are suing a stray for compensation. and under that regime on lot of countries are concerned about the existing rules. so it would cover any contract the u.s. government would have with the foreign corporations, natural resource for natural lance, mining projects, running tunnels, bridges, ports, it's crazy. would not catch a u.s. court but a tribunal. they could then be in power to radar treasury. so the third thing that was really her feeling is that japan, despite setting a condition for getting in the talks that they would negotiate is refusing to negotiate market access for five key agricultural products. that is an interesting development. the memo says something like someone needs to talk to the prime minister in japan and make sure he is that instructions

right. before the worrisome thing is the u.s. pushing financial deregulation. every other country is on the other side. the u.s. is trying to put in the agreement that you cannot use capital control which is a very common macro policy. you want to stop it or they're is a rate in the currency and you want to freeze its current international monetary fund even says this is a good tool. the u.s. wants to basically forbid the use of that. the fifth big issue is what is not in there. the u.s. congress has been clear that the need to be enforceable labor standards, enforceable environmental standards, some cities and countries says. none of that is agreed. the state-owned enterprise chapter, the environment chapter, and the patent on madison chapter is apparently in a total shambles. the other countries are so far rejected u.s. demands on those key issues.

>> to you want to add something? >> laurie has covered all the bases, and i don't have access to the leaks. some i will defer. it is clearly evident in short, simple terms, the members of the union understand that our government is slowly but surely surrendering. we call them trade deals. we believe in trade. we understand the value of that. savage done in fair terms instead of free terms and now it is not even in free terms fox is a surrender agreement. that will be the battle line. >> another question.

>> when the administration comes end to persuade congress to pass these agreements, did you said they posit the growth and jobs based upon export? they don't look at the countervailing loss of jobs in other words, we may get 40,000 jobs because we're going to give better access to the other guys market? they only pause of the 40,000 of considered the others? >> we have yet to see someone posit the loss of the jobs. we only hear aerospace's a good example. i will use a real-life example

in selling aircraft to china. china will sign we want to buy 100 triple seven's you will have to do under the trade arrangements some production here in china. that will create. we may move some of the production, but for the overall order we will be hiring folks in seattle and portland, which, to build those, make that order and get it in on time. at 100 airplane, china will serve you want to buy another hundred. it is going to require some production shift to china. they never sent back the production that was traded.

we slowly but surely transfer the capabilities of building a complete airplane in china. they are launching a new airplane that looks just like a 737. we were never told -- it never makes its way. we know from experience, but it never makes its way from government sources to the public consumption that we have traded away jobs and give away technology. and once it is out you cannot recover to. then they become your biggest competitor. and in no way that they manipulate their own currencies, we cannot compete against that. we are simply offering of surrender documents to make this

more feasible, to make it more palatable, to make it legal to do. that is what is happening. it is real life. as we see. employment in key industries is in jeopardy. we have really impacted it in a negative way. it becomes even worse. i don't know what it will take for the american public to really wakeup. maybe quit using the acronyms two pp. representing a large number of mechanics, it sounds like astp we need to a stir using terms in a general discussion. this is of serious thing. it is a job killer for you.

>> well, just a follow-up on that polling, of course, los giving away the 777 technology to china it was a big deal how many jobs have lost giving away technology. >> china on the triple seven, i use as an example. it was really 737. so when you produce a few sloshed and wednesday -- wing section, wings being the heart and soul of an airplane, fuselages of two board seats and it. and restrooms. small states, by the way. the wings of a critical technology. once that is gone, once they

develop and master the skills and jobs that trouble with it are traded out. a place like seattle washington. and those jobs in that room never come back. now we have created a new version of the 737. boeing has understood when you let go when technology leave you pay a terrible price. this has new wing technology. so far we're able to protect someone. now with other new aircraft coming on line we are going to be in a fight of our lives to preserve the technology here in the united states. i might add, a lot of the technology and the design for commercial aircraft found its way in defense r&d. and that is sponsored by the u.s. taxpayer. and analysts have a question to

wind as the u.s. taxpayer, when we commercialize and defense products from the wind is the taxpayer realize a return on investments? today i can tell you, we have never had a return on investment so that is why people should be concerned. we still have the capabilities in this country of great engineering, like nowhere else on earth. but when we do engineering we are too quick to give it away for short-term corporate profit. >> let me and, it is a different point, but it may help flesh out the last two comments. to the extent that we have an articulated national trend objective from the end ministration in the form of the national export initiative, the president is intention to to

have double exports within five years. i would like to just did a few figures on the table to put that into some perspective. i think that they tie in to the last to comment. when i arrived in washington 1971 u.s. exports were $60 billion. u.s. imports for $61 billion, and there was a minor panic about our trade problem. so $1 billion trade deficit in 1971 amounted to about one-and-a-half percent of our exports. so since then we have -- iraq's words -- actually five dahlia 96 *. so that exports last year or $2 trillion. imports were over two and a half trillion. our trade deficit amounted to over 20 percent of our ex works. so i would say anybody that has any regard for history, logical

or arithmetic, should look at those numbers and question the premise which is clear from the chamber of commerce idea of what traders that is what the ministrations talking about. but history tells you that you cannot get there from here. you cannot actually improve our economic performance by doubling of exports unless you pay attention to the rest of the picture. the last part of what tom has been trying to say they have really resisted. it is hard work, but it serves the national interest other comments? yes, joanne. >> someone in one all of you might think about the whole

landscape of trade agreements has changed. it is not just the united states that has been negotiating trade agreements but just about everybody else. with the wto having lost effectiveness, at least until the last few days in trade negotiations have been so many regional and bilateral trade agreements. the composition of trade, a much larger percentage of trade now is in components and not finished goods and that we need to be able to have access to global supply chains in order to have competitive sectors.

how does u.s. trade policy fit within that? thank you. >> you want to take that one? >> well, first of all, one of the most transformational developments was the change between 200 years of trading agreements which stow with tariffs, cutting border taxes, and limits on the amount of stuff, raising quotas. and in nafta and wto in the mid-1990s which became effectively vehicles to deliver an entire agenda of non trade policies from extensions of patents, the general agreement on tariffs and trade did not have intellectual property rules , financial service to regulation, limits on food safety. it's just that the guild trade business of cutting border taxes and saying you can sell more of it in each country. so one of the biggest transformations which came hand

in glove was the ability effectively the u.s. trade agreements to get hijacked and to these trojan horse mechanisms and with that can be enormous controversy that is not built in the u.s. public and in our congress about trade agreements. i suspect if it were just about tariffs it would not be having a big debate about trade authority or agreements. it is all the other stuff. investment rose the promote offshore and the investment will that nafta and the other fda's literally make it safer, less costly for companies to move offshore with the production. those are policy decisions that i think would be very hard to get through congress the normal way. that is one of the biggest changes. there have always been regional and bilateral agreements. if you look of the history of trade must every agreement gone back a long time was regional or bilateral. what was the anomaly was the idea of a global agreement.

and what happened at the wto, the highly anticipated, i don't know i would say it is back, simply that the most reason did not employ altogether with delegates checking things at each other said and refusing to sign the final declaration which has been the outcome of most ministerial. in the beginning there were actually several big multilateral agreements that were agreed. communication, financial-services. it is just wrong that this is the first thing the wto has ever done. in fact, this is a very modest in the embarrassing small thing that wto is done. was celebrated because it meant that they did not have to pull the life-support plug in a row with the patients. so the fact that the wto did not die is probably the big success. i am not clear that the legitimacy is altogether

restored. in fact if you would like to make a bet over lunch or dinner, i suspect we will be talking about the negotiations again. in the final thing is on the composition of trade, basically what you are describing is off shoring, outsourcing. things they used to be made here where u.s. manufacturing workers would make everything from the parts, the doors to actually milling and then smiled during to making this deal workers, making the steel to the machinists cutting and putting it together, to the autoworkers' assembling into automobiles, all of that was done here. and so what is often called enter corporate trade my e multinational companies that have outsourced major parts of their production and then bringing it back together for assembling sometimes you're but

often not for lower wage, that is the 5 million u.s. manufacturing jobs 40,000 facilities closed. that is a big part of the story of why the u.s. now has a real wages at the same level of 1972. free trade microeconomic theory shows that when you liberalize trade benefits go to capitol and away from labor because you basically have said 5 million high wage union benefits middle-class jobs away. you have a lot of displaced union manufacturing workers who are now competing in the economy for the service sector jobs. all this talk about income inequality, the president has been recently touting cut trade agreements are a major part of the. the u.s. department of labor says that when a manufacturer workers displaced through trade and reemployed to the service sector on average they lose $8,000 in their income. they become part of that stretched bottom working-class

that is working to a three jobs. in the profit is going to the of shores. that is what the supply chain is in reality in a global economy under these rules. >> i am not an economist by training or practice, but i do understand, i think, the were 11. and really what we're talking about here in trade is using a terminology or using the understanding of trade relations and trade deals as a means to deregulate the global rules of engagement that underpin a moral society and how countries treat and respect one another. and that is what we have witnessed since this thing has taken off in a big way. nafta was the first really big demonstration of that.

and i will cite, having served at a tool and die apprenticeships at general electric and just before jack welch arrived on the scene, i pay attention to that company, and i still do for many reasons. his comment many years ago to a group of managers in florida that the ideal factory, not a u.s. factory, not -- but the ideal factory, manufacturing would be built on a barge. did there could be a more in the port of the company the pay the lowest -- country that pay the lowest wages to. we were kind of amazed that he

could utter that, but in practice that has been adopted by much of a corporate mindset. not just in the u.s., but in the world. and under the guise of trade deals, trade agreements, it has really been used to keep workers in the world suppressed in terms of their wages or quality of life. and in the labor movement that really it sums up why we take such a harsh view in have these trade deals are made, our insistence that a certain international standard or norm be applied by the international labor organization which guarantees certain fundamental human rights sadly to say, the united states never ratified that particular u.n. convention. most countries have, but it is making them practice it which

has been a challenge, and then they will use these trade agreements which come up today as the tool or the mechanism that they need to disregard them and set them aside. this is very fundamental to what labor is about and how the relationship among nations should be governed. so whether we make finished products or components, those are all details to a bigger question. it is -- it is respect for humans on this planet. and this trade deal, whether it is wto, we cannot deny so many of what americans believe our sovereign rights. they do not understand everything. and how it is now being used against them. and the trade deals such as nafta or what is proposed in the dpp to make is the surrender of certain rights and certain moral

principles that i stake. we are surrendering. and i don't like it. >> if you have a question. >> my name is tom taught former general motors employee. i started on an assembly line. the arguments today lean toward putting the blame on industry and the greed of industry leaders. how would like to shift the thinking back to maybe the brilliance of strategists in government and how our government is not winning that battle. your analogy of putting manufacturing operation on a ship and lending them where the wages are less, when i worked in a think tank in general motors, yes, that was one of our conclusions. ..

you can't lame industry for going to the >> that is why they make so many more cars in china.

china. i believe our government has to get more intelligent, a lot more strategic about exchange rates, about trade law and about this new global business. we are encumbered with, we have to get public and public excited about voting for any issues. it isn't as simple as a dig tatar or a very narrow government. i don't know how we do it and i am very excited to hear the arguments today. those of you have done an excellent job of presenting where we are and why we are where we are. i like the tied to history. i don't know how to get more brilliant and i'm sitting here listening and that is why i come to these meetings. i hope we can do something. thank you. >> if i could respond, i don't disagree with what you have said

but there is the private sector. there is business and there is industry. the role of government should be to win a private industry gets out of whack or falters the role of government is to set things straight. and when we have an opportunity to do that and to insist that the rules of engagement whether it's in foreign trade or anything else we do becomes fair and there is a deference to a just system, then we are obligated to her suit that path. in the trade deals of recent we have deviated wildly from that path. in your example with gm, the challenge is if we do a deal with china we should

strategically have in the back of our minds an idea for the next great thing that we will build here as we left that technology out of our control. maybe in the manufacturing of their planes they should think a little more about that as well. we would be a little better off i think but thank you for those comments. >> the only thing i would add is the role that gm place is not necessarily as the poor company that has to do the only thing he can to survive but whether as an applicant for setting up the rules that actually promote this low road strategy of manufacturing competition. so it's a little circular to expect the government to do otherwise with the companies such as gm are very powerful and are pushing for the agenda that

really is the one that has grouped profitable for many of them but very devastated for u.s. workers in the middle-class. i think what is an interesting question is how some other countries france is like germany or finland have actually made policies sweden as a country that are manufacturing policies that are aimed at the national interest in a way where unions industry and workers have had quite a think a different perspective and even though germany's wages are higher than ours there has been some sense of the national interest versus just the corporate bottom line. germany's rate is much much higher higher and they're the world's killer exporter and they don't have the trade deficits we have been at the manufacturing turn those are choices. yes there is politics to it that at this point that politics is for everyone who wants to have a

different trade policy to hold their member of congress accountable first to make sure there is never a fast-track and second to turn around their current trade agenda because it is in our control. right now we have a lot of powerful corporations that are trying to have it their way and not trade agreements that work for all of us. >> before as asked the last question if low wages and lower total compensation were enough we would be winning right now and it's other things, other public policies and subsidies and things like that which had not responded well. we have a question which has reached us from the c-span3 audience so i had announced to finish up with this question. if i can paraphrase it, is the wto remediable? should we continue our commitment to participate in it

and if not what if anything would replace it? >> that is a big question for monday morning. [laughter] i cannot proffer an answer that would say it's remedial but i believe if we could go back to the drawing board, and we could practice in this country or all countries could meet on in each of flooding, where all the participants in an economy would have input and have a say and let their concerns be addressed, you could create something new on a global scale that could work. i don't say something can't be done but the way it is right nos

based on exclusion, not to inclusion and we know for sure it's not working. this illusion i would have to think about that for a lot longer period of time. >> it is a very good question and it's bigger than we can answer here. i thought about it and if you go to our web site trade watch.org and look at wto and alternatives there is a global organization that is called our world is not for sale. that's unions and consumer environmental family farm and religious groups around the world. they have laid out some principles of what a good global trade system would have. i would summarize it very briefly as you get rid of all the corporate trojan horse stuff that has gotten stuffed into the trade agreements. the finance in the promotion of offshoring a limit on buying

local procurement and the limits on food safety. you connect some of the existing global human rights standards, the rights to him medicine etc. to become a floor decency. the labor standards of the international labor organization which sovereign countries have agreed to. you make that the floor of decency and what's left of the trade piece, the real trade teas and you put the florid decency under it that makes at the basis of the national minimum wage, the national law. you actually have a multilevel trade regime that gives us the benefits of trade without all the baggage and all the garbage that has been stuffed into these trade agreements using fast-track. trade watch.org you can see more details of that and again thank you for making the event and if anyone here in the room wants to buy a copy of said book gets over on the table. speech reitzig three lorry we

will have that be the last word. thank you to an economy in crisis and to the american bar association, to all of you and to our panelists, i think we have the kind of discussion we were looking forward to. thanks. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

foreign affairs committee, we will hear from secretary of state john kerry about the nuclear deal with iran. you can join the conversation via c-span chat and facebook. it ran and six world powers are meeting in vienna this week --

iran and six world powers are meeting in vienna this week. hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. this is about an hour. >> thank you all so much. andst say i am really -- this is because of the panelists we have here today. this crowd is unbelievable. don't you guys agree? have a fewe would people looking to get warm. this is the largest turnout we have had for one of these. we really have had some excellent experts today. knows, counselor and trust for c i s, senior professor at ais johns hopkins. we are glad to have him. robert einhorn, assistant

secretary for proliferation -- you are in the carter administration, right? i wish. that was the clinton administration. >> and you were also an advisor to president obama. >> and secretary clinton. friedman, who has won more polluters than any one person right now. he has won three of them. rob a blue one of the most influential people on foreign , froms in america today his place where he sits and writes on the op-ed page of "the new york times." he is also our old friend. mr. einhorn, why don't you start us off by telling us -- what is this deal? what are we talking about here?

encompass, and what do both sides hope to get out of it? call it a would not complete deal. i call it a preparatory deal, a preliminary deal. it was designed by the u.s. to stop the clock on iran's nuclear program. the program could advance substantially in the coming months. this deal very comprehensively and for six months puts a cap on that program. all of the issues you read about plutonium reactor, the centrifuges -- all of those things have been cap. while the negotiating over the next six months for comprehensive deal, there will be no advance with the program, and that is very important. also there are some innovative procedures, so we can be very

confident that iran is not in from thehe inspectors international atomic energy agency will be able to visit the key facilities every day, which is usually once every week or two weeks. they will be going to some facility. a facility they have not had access to before. workshops where the iranians produce centrifuges, uranium mines. it is important to get a handle ore.ur -- on uranium there are some sanctions eating -- sanctions-easing measures. cripplingaving a effect on their economy, and by estimates of the administration, the sanctions-easing steps will be worth at most about $7

billion for the six-month period. that compares to roughly $30 billion during the six-month period that they will lose in oil revenues compared to six months period before the oil sanctions were imposed. i have seen estimates that the total sanctions bill for iran is about $130 per year. up to $7 billion is very small, so i think they are getting a freeze on iran's program for very little. they are also getting a slight rollback. if you remember, prime minister about thetalked accumulation of enriched uranium, enriched to the 20% level, which gets you near to weapons grade. he said that once he gets to 250

kilograms, that is his redline. this deal roles it back to zero in that category -- this deal rolls it back to zero in that category. it is your put into a powdered form or diluted to five percent. it does a lot. all of this is preparatory to a final deal, and there are general principles agreed to in the document from november 24, and they talk about a long-term agreement. they could not reach agreement on exactly how long that would be. they talk about a mutually defined uranium enrichment program that would only be alsod if there is agreement on specific limits and monitoring measures to make sure that you ran does not have the capability to break out of constraints suddenly and quickly get enough highly enriched uranium for bombs.

really put off. the disposition of this plutonium production reactor, they could not agree on that. of the finalff deal. the disposition of this underground uranium enrichment facility off to the future. the next six months will be very hard negotiations. the president just the other day said he gave it about a 50/50 possibility of actually reaching a final deal. i think it is a very promising first step. >> i would ask you -- is this a good deal or a bad deal? where are we? what do you think of it? >> i think it is a good deal considering the context in which it was being pursued and considering the legacies of less number of years in which the relationship became increasingly antagonistic